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GRUPPENPROFIL IFAR2 
Die „Interdisziplinäre Forschungsgruppe Abrüstung, Rüstungskontrolle und Risikotech-
nologien (IFAR2)“ beschäftigt sich mit dem komplexen Zusammenspiel von 
rüstungsdynamischen Faktoren, dem potenziellen Waffeneinsatz, der Strategiedebatte sowie 
den Möglichkeiten von Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung als sicherheitspolitische 
Instrumente. Der Schwerpunkt der Arbeit liegt dabei auf folgenden Forschungslinien: 
 
 Grundlagen, Möglichkeiten und Formen von Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und 
Nonproliferation nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts sowie die Entwicklung von 
anwendungsbezogenen Konzepten präventiver Rüstungskontrolle 
 „Monitoring“ der fortschreitenden Rüstungsdynamik und Rüstungskontrollpolitik in 
Europa und weltweit mit Fokus auf moderne Technologien 
 Technische Möglichkeiten existierender und zukünftiger (Waffen-) Entwicklungen, 
besonders im Bereich Raketenabwehr und Weltraumbewaffnung 
Der steigenden Komplexität solcher Fragestellungen wird in Form einer interdisziplinär 
arbeitenden Forschungsgruppe Rechnung getragen. Die Arbeitsweise zeichnet sich durch die 
Kombination von natur- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Methoden und Expertisen aus. Durch 
die intensiven Kooperationen mit anderen Institutionen unterschiedlicher Disziplinen wird 
insbesondere Grundlagenforschung im Bereich der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen 
Dimension von Rüstungskontrolle geleistet. Darüber hinaus beteiligt sich IFAR auch an einer 
Reihe von Expertennetzwerken, die Expertisen aus Forschung und Praxis zusammenführen 
und Forschungsanstrengungen bündeln. 
 
Die Arbeitsgruppe hat eine langjährige Expertise in den Bereichen kooperative 
Rüstungssteuerung und Rüstungstechnologien sowie verschiedene wissenschaftliche 
Kernkompetenzen aufgebaut. Diese flossen in die international vielbeachteten Beiträge des 
IFSH zur Rüstungskontrolle ein, so das Konzept der 'kooperativen Rüstungssteuerung' sowie 
Studien zur konventionellen und nuklearen Rüstung und Abrüstung, zur Bewertung 
technologischer Rüstungsprozesse, zur strategischen Stabilität, zur strukturellen 
Angriffsunfähigkeit sowie zur Vertrauensbildung und europäischen Sicherheit. 
 
IFAR bietet verschiedene Formen der Nachwuchsförderung an. Neben Lehrtätigkeiten 
gemeinsam mit der Universität Hamburg und im Studiengang 'Master of Peace and Security 
Studies' können auch Praktika in der Arbeitsgruppe absolviert werden.  
 
Die Arbeitsgruppe kooperiert mit einer Vielzahl von nationalen und internationalen Or-
ganisationen. 
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The Revolution in Military Affairs, its Driving Forces, Elements and Complexity* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The current concept of a “Revolution in Military Affairs” mainly characterizes the 
transformation of the US military to smaller, more powerful forces. It is driven by structural 
changes in the international system, the high investment in R&D and military expenditures by 
the US government, the dramatic advancements in Information and Communication 
Technologies and the integration of these military, doctrinal, and technological factors into 
new military structures and tactics. This current revolution in American affairs has been a 
capital-intensive evolution, and while these innovations have lead to tactical victories over 
opposing forces on the battlefield, it is not yet clear that they have contributed to stability in 
the larger strategic context. Indeed, even the tactical advantages are eroding as potential 
opponents retool their own military doctrines. The strategic response runs the length of 
technological spectrum, from the development of countermeasures such as in the proliferation 
of WMD to the development of low-tech warfare strategies and tactics like IEDs detonated by 
cell phone. The proliferation of conventional weapons combined with the adaptation of new 
asymmetric tactics is another consequence. Precision weapons are minimizing the casualties 
of the RMA forces, but not necessarily the casualties of the adversary. The Iraqi war 
demonstrates that the fog of war is not overcome and wars fought with Precision Guided 
Munitions are not necessarily “clean”. In consideration of these facts the efforts must be 
intensified to develop new methods for effective arms control. 
Overall the key task for the globalized world is first and foremost to develop strategies to win 
the “hearts and minds” of people in zones of violent conflict. The inclusion of the civil society 
is a basic element and armed forces should seek the dialogue with the civil society before it 
comes to war. 
 
 
1. Science, Technology and the Military  
 
Science and technology are dominant factors in modern society. The application of science is 
fascinating and can be highly beneficial to humanity, but it has also led to the development of 
the means to destroy human civilization. Science, which was developed on humanistic 
foundations and justified in terms of the betterment of mankind, contributed significantly to 
the pursuit of military purposes during the 20th century. The industrial and scientific 
revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries also politicized science, culminating most visibly in 
World War II with projects such as missiles, nuclear weapons, radar, operations research and 
cryptography. In the 20th century, three important science-based innovations led to significant 
technological progress, but also to new military options: (1) nuclear weapons, (2) 
biotechnology and (3) information and communication technologies (ICT). Science, 
Engineering and Technology (SET) is used to modernize and build up weapons arsenals, as 
well as to influence military strategy via the adoption of military and civilian research results 
(Add-On Paradigm). The distinction between military and non-military activities is becoming 
more and more blurred. Especially in the USA, but also in the UK, the military sector has “a 
very large and disproportionate effect” on SET. A newly published study from Scientists for 
Global Responsibility examined the influence of the military in the governance and direction 
of SET in the UK and concluded that the military sector is a major player in the commercial 
                                               
* This Report is an updated and extended version of an article with the same title which was written in 2006 for 
the Physics Journal Complexity No. 50, pages 50-61, published in 2008. 
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partnerships in SET supported by the government.1 The report’s authors write that “military 
support of emerging technology such as nanotechnology is high (especially in the USA)”. The 
next section explores the origins and driving forces of the current revolution. 
 
 
2. Revolution in Military Affairs: Origins and Driving Forces 
 
The concept of military revolutions goes back to the 1950s, but as Charles Townshend 
observed, “modern war” has to be seen as “the product of three distinct kinds of change: 
administrative, technological and ideological.”2 There have been several revolutions in 
military strategy throughout history, such as the innovation of the longbow in the 14th 
century; the introduction of gunpowder and artillery in the 15th; the Napoleonic leveé en 
masse – the first compulsory military service; the communications revolution brought by 
telegraphy; mechanization in the late 19th and early 20th century, which resulted in such 
technologies as tanks, aircraft and submarines; and, perhaps most importantly, nuclear 
weapons. Williamson Murray and McGregor Knox distinguish between military revolutions 
and revolution in military affairs.3 In their view, military revolutions such as the “French 
Revolution” or the “advent of nuclear weapons” are cumulative and hard to predict in their 
consequences for modern states and societies. Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs), on the 
other hand, result in the defeat of enemies (e.g. in the 1991 Iraq war), but do not necessarily 
shape the character of states and societies.  
 
The origins4 of the current debate began in the 1970 and 1980s, when the Soviet Chief of 
Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov5, and other Soviet analysts coined the term “military-
technical revolution” to describe technical developments such as sensors, electronics, jet 
engines and precision munitions acting at stand-off range. The NATO and US “Follow-on 
Forces Attack” (FOFA) strategy intended to use “high-tech” strikes to counter the three-to-
one numerical advantage of the Warsaw Pact armies in terms of main battle tanks, artillery 
and manpower. William J. Perry, then Undersecretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering (1971-1981), introduced the “Offset strategy” to offset the Soviet advantages in 
numbers by Western technological superiority without maintaining a large standing army that 
would cripple “our own economy”.6 A new set of powerful military systems such as stealth 
fighters, global communications, and cruise missiles have been developed. Andrew Marshall, 
a leading proponent of RMA thinking, adopted Orgakov’s arguments and started a debate on 
the coming military revolutions and possible answers by the US. He was particularly skeptical 
of the way traditional military thinking regarded large ships, aircraft and main battle tanks as 
the key pillars of armies fighting a prospective third world war. Starting in 1973, Marshall 
developed a small think tank, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA), within the DoD and 
nurtured many disciples who are now at the center of the Bush administration (including 
                                               
1  S. Parkinson/P. Webber (eds): Soldiers in the Laboratory. Military Involvement in Science and Technology –  
and some alternatives by Chris Langley, January 2005. 
2  C. Townshend: The Oxford History of Modern War, Oxford 2005, chapter 1, p. 3ff.  
3  W. Murray, M. Knox (eds): The Dynamics of Military Revolutions 1320-2050, New York, 2001, chapter 1. 
4  For the origins see: L. Freedman: The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318, Oxford 1998; B. 
Møller: The Revolution in Military Affairs: Myth or Reality, Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, 2002 
[http://www.copri.dk/copri/researchers/moeller/RMA.doc]. 
5  Orgakov’s writings were meant as “a wake-up call” to draw attention to Soviet inferiority to the West in terms 
of computer technology, electronics and strike capability, see: G. Chapman: An Introduction to the Revolution 
in Military Affairs, in: Changing Threats to Global Security: Peace or Turmoil. Proceedings XV International 
Amaldi Conferences, Helsinki 2003, pp. 123-14. 
6  W. Perry: ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs: Peace or War in the 21st Century’, (Working Paper Nr.14, The 
Center for International Relations, University of California, Los Angeles 1997). 
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Donald Rumsfeld). Ultimately, the proponents of RMA dream of eliminating Clausewitz’s 
“fog of war”, i.e. removing unpredictability on the battlefield.  
 
The starting point for public perceptions of RMA weaponry was Operation Desert Storm, the 
US-led war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991. This was the first time that many systems 
developed to cope with the armies of the Warsaw Pact were used under battlefield conditions. 
The use of GPS- or laser-guided weapons delivered by stealth fighters dominated the TV 
coverage and created the perception that the operation was a “surgical and clean war”. 
Politicians and the military recognized the potential of this “new kind of warfare”. The Iraqi 
side clearly came off worse, suffering an estimated 25,000 to 75,000 casualties.7 Marshall 
commissioned a study by Andrew F. Krepinevitch, who drew the conclusion that the military 
revolution already existed at an operational level, but still required organizational and 
operational reforms. In 1993, Marshall also promoted the idea that new high-tech capabilities 
would lead to dominance on the conventional battlefield. The Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 
documents, published in 1996 and 2000, aimed to describe how the US forces should expect 
to conduct warfare in the 21st century. They identified four technological trends: (1) long-
range precision capability, combined with a wide range of delivery systems; (2) the ability to 
produce a broader range of weapon effects, from less lethal to hard-target kill; (3) low 
observable technologies and the ability to mask friendly forces; and (4) information systems 
and systems integration. The documents emphasize that high technology is only one 
dimension of warfighting. Military success also depends upon leadership, personnel, training, 
structures and operational concepts. Several schools of thought concerning the RMA can be 
identified today,8 and the US military has widely accepted the “systems of systems” or 
“network-centric” approach.  
 
Defense Transformation and the “Bush Doctrine” 
The term “Revolution in Military Affairs” characterizes the current and ongoing 
transformation of US armed forces. With the Bush administration, the proponents of the RMA 
idea reached the centers of US military power and started to affect the US military.9 Then a 
candidate for the presidency, in 1999, George W. Bush said that “[o]ur military is still 
organized for the Cold War threats, [rather] than for the challenges of a new century – for 
industrial age operations, rather than for information age battles”.10 Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld and his former Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, have described themselves as 
“radical reformers” of the inert US military system and stressed the need for the 
“transformation of the US forces”. The first full “top-down review” of the US military, the 
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 proposed only minor reductions in numbers and did not 
change the status quo. The attacks of September 11, 2001, interpreted as “acts of war”, 
confirmed the view of top US decision makers that the threats of the 21st century were 
“asymmetric” and that US military structures have to be transformed in accordance with the 
new situation.11 
                                               
7  M. Leitenberg: Deaths in War and Conflicts Between 1945 and 2000, Cornell University, Peace Studies 
Program Occasional Paper 29, 2003.[there is an updated version (3rd ed.) from 2006] 
8  M. O’Hanlon: Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, 2000 Washington D.C. , p. 11-17. 
9  A. Erger: Yoda and the Jedis: The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Transformation of War, in: Bridges. 
The OST’s Publication on Science & Technology Policy, Vol. 7, September 20, 2005, 
[http://www.ostina.org/content/view/274/]. 
10 G. W. Bush: A Period of Consequences, The Citadel, South Carolina, September 23, 1999, 
[http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/news99/92399_defense.htm]. 
11 See: M. Gordon and B. Trainor: COBRA II. The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New 
York 2006. 
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The war in Afghanistan in 2001, which saw a combination of precision bombardment, 
battlefield surveillance by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and only Special Forces on the 
ground, was prosecuted successfully and seemed to confirm the success of the RMA 
paradigm. Also in 2001, Rumsfeld declared that “Network Centric Warfare” was the 
Pentagon’s new organizational principle for military planning and the use of forces. 12 The 
“decapitation strike” launched on Baghdad on March 20, 2003 and the following massive air 
campaign and full-scale ground attack on Iraq lead to a stunning defeat of the Iraqi forces and 
a breakdown of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  
  
The basic idea of the “Bush doctrine” is to wage “preventive war” against terrorist 
organizations and rogue states. In his first state of the union address after the 9/11 attacks, 
President Bush stated that “time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers 
gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer”.13 In his West Point speech, 
President Bush warned: “If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long”. 
The National Strategy 2006 declares: “We are fighting a new enemy with global reach. The 
United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive 
measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep 
them on the run.”14 Additionally, the idea that US technological capabilities make it possible 
to conduct warfare with a minimum of casualties and destruction is seen as central in the US 
public perception. President Bush outlined the essentials of this modern system of war in a 
speech to workers at a Boeing aircraft plant in April 2004: “By a combination of creative 
strategies and advanced technology, we are redefining war on our terms. … We’ve applied 
the new powers of technology... to strike an enemy force with speed and incredible precision. 
By a combination of creative strategies and advanced technologies, we are redefining war on 
our terms. In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation.”15 The RMA idea, 
which the US Congress, the media and the public now tend to label “Defense transformation”, 
is at the core of the security and defense policy of the current Bush administration. 
 
Critics of the RMA argue that RMA technologies will proliferate, especially if they become 
cheaper. It is also argued that RMA technologies are particularly sensitive and thus vulnerable 
to counter-measures or direct attacks that take advantage of this. For instance, it is believed 
that well-trained cyber-soldiers are capable of penetrating or otherwise attacking electronic 
networks. Skeptics of the RMA paradigm argue that RMA might be better labeled an 
evolution rather than a revolution in military affairs. Many platforms, operational concepts 
and ideas that are now assigned to the RMA have been developed and tested since the 1970s 
and 1980s. We should also note that the RMA has so far manifested itself more or less 
entirely as a “Revolution in American Affairs”. RMA is “capital-intensive, high-technology-
prone and militarily decisive”.16 The term “Revolution in Military Affairs” is today a 
buzzword among strategists inside the US military elite, but in the research community “there 
is no consensus on whether the recent changes in military weaponry and strategy made 
possible by advances in information technology should be called a revolution.”17 
                                               
12 Department of Defense, Network Centric Warfare. Report to Congress, July 27, 2001, 
  [http://www.Defenselink.mil/nii/NCW/]. 
13 The President’s State of the Union Address, Washington, January 29, 2002, 
URL [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html]. 
14 The National Security Strategy of the United Sates of America, March 2006, 
  [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/sectionIII.html]. 
15 President Bush Outlines Progress in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030416-9.html]. 
16 L. Freedman, The Third World War?, Survival, Vol. 43(4), Winter 2002-2003, pp. 61-88, p.61. 
17 Chapman 2003: 123-141 (see footnote 5).  
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The Driving Forces 
Several political, economical and technical driving forces can be identified behind the current 
interest in RMA, especially in the United States:  
 
1. Structural changes in the international system and a unipolar system of US military 
primacy in a new strategic environment; 
2. High levels of investment in R&D and military expenditure, especially in the US; 
3. Dramatic progress in ICT and other areas; 
4. Integration of tactics, force structures and technological advances, training and 
simulation. 
 
Ad. 1 – Structural Changes in the international system  
The end of the East-West confrontation and the demise of the former Soviet Union brought a 
shift towards a more unipolar system with the US as the unchallenged sole global military 
superpower. Combined with major advances in science and technology, the main 
characteristics of US security policy are new military concepts and the will to use military 
power. Additionally, the offensive “preventive war doctrine” of the current Bush 
administration and the rhetoric that calls for “regime change” in rogue states has set aside the 
“last-resort principle” of previous US governments.18 The US, which accounts for 46 percent 
of global military spending in 2006, has lowered the threshold on the use of military force, 
especially by means of the rhetoric of “regime-change” and the “war on terror” (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Top ten countries by military spending in 2006 in market exchange rate term (at 
constant 2005 US$)19 
Rank Country Size $b World 
Share, % 
1 USA 528.7 46 
2 UK 59.2 5 
3 France 53.1 5 
4 China 49.5 4 
5 Japan 43.7  4 
6 Germany 37.0 3 
7 Russia 34.7 3 
8 Italy 29.9 3 
9 Saudi Arabia 29.0  3 
10 India 23.9 2 
Total  887 77 
 
 
                                               
18 Carl Conetta argues that the term “preventative war” is too generous because “it prescribes applying force 
even when reasonable people would conclude that conflict probabilities and adversary capabilities are modest 
or low.” C. Conetta: Arms Control in the Age of Strategic and Military Revolution in: S. Albrecht, R. Braun, 
T. Held (eds): Einstein weiterdenken. Thinking Beyond Einstein. Verantwortung des Wissenschaftlers und 
Frieden im 21. Jahrhundert. Scientific Responsibility in the 21st Century, Frankfurt, 2006; pp. 243-272. 
19 Table: The fifteen major spenders in 2006, Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) 2007, [http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf] 
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“high-tech“            vs.           “low-tech“ 
sale (arms export) industrial basis required 
fast proliferation slow proliferation 
easy handling 
universal availability 
R&D, simulation and training 
complicated handling 
expensive production 
Ad. 2 - High levels of investment in R&D and military expenditure and a strong scientific-
industrial base 
 
World military expenditure increased by around 22 percent in real terms over the five-year 
period 2002-2006, reaching $1158 billion constant (2005) US$ in 2006. This is only 3 percent 
lower than the 1988 peak of the Cold War military spending.20 US military strategy is 
characterized by highly advanced military technologies and the infrastructures needed to use 
them. The US relies on a military, industrial and scientific network of government-owned 
arsenals, laboratories, industrial contractors and military institutions that stem from the Cold 
War.21 According to Sapolsky et al.: “The driving force in the defense budget is not overseas 
threats but the need to sustain contractors with indispensable defense skills and 
technologies.”22 The core argument for this strategy is that the US always has to be one step 
ahead of its potential opponents to discourage them. There is a widespread belief that the 
United States’ military-technological advantage means that no antagonist can oppose US 
forces with conventional weapons. Logically, future challenges would be “asymmetric”, e.g. 
terrorism, sabotage, low-intensity conflicts, possibly involving the use of unconventional 
weapons such as biological or even nuclear weapons. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush 
administration has accelerated this by focusing on a “capability based” development and 
procurement approach. Figure 2 shows the increase in the US Defense Budget in the last few 
years. For the 2009 fiscal year, the Bush administration has submitted a request to Congress 
for approximately 515.4 billion US Dollars.23 
 
Compared to low-tech weapons such as small arms and light weapons, high-tech weaponry 
requires an industrial basis, is expensive to produce, difficult to use, has long R&D cycles, 
and is usually less prone to proliferation. It also requires the development of new strategies by 
means of training, exercises and the simulation of complicated procedures. Low-tech 
weaponry, on the other hand, is universally available, easy to use, and can proliferate rapidly. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of high-tech vs. low-tech weapons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout history, the partition between civilian and military technologies has been 
permeable. Scientists were educated in civilian universities and technologies were produced 
by civilian contractors. Only in the industrial age did specialization increase, thus making 
separate military developments possible. During the Cold War, huge volumes of resources 
                                               
20 See: Table on world and regional military expenditure, 1988-2006, Information from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2007 
[http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_wnr_table.html] 
21 See: H. M. Sapolsky, E. Gholz, A. Kaufmann: Security Lessons from the Cold War, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
78(4), July/August 1999, pp. 77-89. 
22 Ibid. p. 88. 
23 See: DoD Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request, Press Release, February 2008,  
[http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/2009_Budget_Rollout_Release.pdf] 
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were put into specialist military developments such as nuclear weapons and missiles. After 
the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration introduced a policy of the increased use 
of civilian technologies for the military. The RMA utilizes advanced ICT from the civilian 
sector.24 The “dual-use paradigm” is certainly at the heart of the current RMA. 
 
The United States is spending more than half of its total R&D budget on the military. In 2006, 
the DoD increased its R&D budget by 4.1 billion US$ to 78.8 current (2007) billion US$. In 
the European Union, four countries (UK, France, Spain, Germany) accounted for 97 percent 
of military R&D spending: 8.9 billion euros (in 2003 values).25 The defense-related 
proportion of 2006 total government R&D in the UK was 28.3 percent, in France it was 22.4 
percent and in Germany, 6.4 percent.26 
 
Ad. 3 - Dramatic Progress in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)  
One of the most important elements in the current RMA is the immense progress made in the 
area of ICT. Figure 3 shows the trend in processor speed for Personal Computers (PC) and 
Mainframe systems in MIPS (million instructions per second).Today a standard PC has the 
required calculating power to handle the data stream of an audio or video channel. In less than 
ten years, PCs will already be able to process data using optical fiber transmission. This is one 
example. Similar predictions could be made regarding for sensor developments, data storage 
and fusion, etc.  
 
 
Figure 3: Trend in Processor Speed 1940-2030 
 
The integration of recent advances in information, communication and surveillance 
technologies makes possible a wide range of new military technologies. The key to future 
developments is not so much a new wave of innovation in military technologies but the 
integration of diverse technologies in a “system of systems” and the permanent upgrading of 
this system via the constant modernization of its elements and connections. New sensors may 
be introduced, or the communication between these elements extended by a new generation of 
micro-processors that enable better and faster data exchange. The US military is particularly 
                                               
24 J. Reppy: A Dual-Use Technology in the New Strategic Environment, in: S. Albrecht, R. Braun, T. Held, pp. 
243-272 (footnote 25); see also J. Reppy, Managing Dual-Use Technology in an Age of Uncertainty, The 
Forum, Vol. 4 No. 1, Article 2, 2006 [www.bepress.com/ forum/vol4/iss1/art2]. 
25 Parkinson and Webber (eds), (see footnote 1). 
26 OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, October 2007 
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enthusiastic about the RMA, which it believes “…will give us dominant battlespace 
knowledge and the ability to take full military advantage of it.”27 
 
 
Ad. 4 - Integration of tactics, force structures and technological advancements: Net-Centric 
Warfare 
 
The USA and its demand to organize its global military strategy more efficiently are currently 
driving military-technical developments towards: 28 
 
 Decentralization and flattening of hierarchies: the RMA removes the distinction 
between the strategic, tactical and operational levels by enabling the direct 
communication of orders and information to the units that require them. 
 Precision strikes: the entire intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) loop 
supports the acquisition of targets and their attack by guided weapons. 
 Increased maneuverability of units that can also be assembled and disassembled on an 
ad hoc basis and over longer distances. 
 Information warfare operations, i.e. the use of information or its processing to coerce 
an opponent by manipulating or destroying its information infrastructure without 
directly engaging its military force. 
 
It remains to be seen whether these military capabilities will really create the intended 
dominance on the battlefield in actual combat situations. However, in purely conceptual 
terms, the following are the key elements for the implementation of RMA: 
 
 Global engagement / access 
 Real-time intelligence 
 Communication and target strategy 
 Space Infrastructure 
 Strong R&D basis including integration 
 and the crosslinking of elements 
 
The crosslinking of as many of these elements as possible is the key factor for the 
transformation of US forces and is currently referred to as net-centric warfare (NCW; see next 
section).29  
 
 
3. The Main Elements of the Current Military Transformation 
 
At the heart of the current RMA is the exploitation of the revolutionary advances of the 
information age. The computational power and storage abilities of computers have been 
increasing by a factor of ten every five years. The main elements of the information age are 
personal computers, fast global audio, video and data communication and the networking of 
many users. Laser and fiber optic communication, encryption technologies and data fusion 
allow rapid routing and processing of data. Additionally, automatic pattern recognition 
                                               
27 Gen. Ronald Fogleman, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff cited after Thayer 2000: p. 44 (footnote 28)  
28 A. Thayer: The Political Effects of Information Warfare: Why New Military Capabilities Cause Old Political 
Dangers, in: Security Studies 1/2000. 
29 A key document on NCW is: Arthur K. Cebrowski/John J. Garstka: Netcentric Warfare: Its Origin and Future, 
in: Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 124, January 1998. According to this source, the concept of 
NCW was inspired by practices in the NY police and US companies. 
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techniques, improved radar systems and infrared sensors (for night vision or weather 
independent surveillance) allow highly detailed imaging of geographical situations. 
 
The main challenge for politics and the military is to implement the technological elements in 
a military and political concept. The current status of the RMA in the US military seems to be 
rather “nebulous and mutable”, but some stable elements can be identified: 30 
 
- Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Intelligence (C4I) 
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
- Precision-guided munitions (PGM) with assorted ranges  
- New weapon principles (laser, microwaves, non-lethal weapons [NLWs]) 
- New sensors and data fusion 
- Stealth technologies 
- Agile, lower-cost weapon platforms and delivery systems (UAVs, cruise missiles) 
- Missile and air defense 
- Stand-off weapons with higher protection 
- Space-based warfare  
 
Table 3: Overview of the elements, technologies and weapon systems: 
Elements Technologies Military System 
Revolutionary advances in 
computers and 
communication for better 
Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance(ISR) 
Computer and network 
technologies, encryption, 
pattern recognition, 
communication 
Command, Control, 
Communication, Computer, 
Intelligence, Tactical Internet 
Jointness and data fusion Sensors, Storage, Platforms, GPS, INS 
Space Networks, JSTARS, 
AWACS, UAV  
Precision munition and 
agile platforms 
Special weapon effects, 
stealth technologies 
JDAM, Cruise Missiles, 
UCAV, B-2, F-117, F-35 JSF, 
Laser-guided bombs 
Smaller force structures Digital Communication Special Forces, UAVs, Soldier systems, NLW, Predator 
 
 
The C-4I/ISR Revolution 
 
Command, Control, Computer, Communication and Intelligence (C4I) networks are based on 
secure communication lines and rapid computer processing from rear command centers to 
forward command lines, including man-portable laptops or the tactical PC stations of fighting 
units. Many platforms, from satellites to UAVs or aircraft, can be used to distribute relevant 
information. The space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation is used to 
determine the exact location of friendly or enemy troops. The US has a computerized “Battle 
Management System”, which not only collects data on combat successes but also presents the 
field commanders with planning information. 
 
A wide range of multi-spectral sensors make possible the creation of Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) networks. ISR acquisition can take many forms: 
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) or Communications Intelligence (COMINT) can identify all 
kinds of military communications as well as signals radiated by equipment. The ISR spectrum 
                                               
30 See Chapman 2003, p. 132 (footnote 5). 
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extends from satellite surveillance and reconnaissance (KH-11, Lacrosse etc.), UAVs (Global 
Hawk, Predator), to aircraft such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS) or AWACS, which serve as flying command and control centers for ground or air 
operations. Images of the target area such as air defense systems or front lines can be useful 
for soldiers, as can updated electronic maps of the terrain. 
 
The information gathered by means of all these data-collection capabilities across so many 
platforms has to be compiled, processed and shared among the different service branches 
(navy, army and air force, etc.). Data fusion from all service elements is thus an important 
feature of NCW. “Joint-service commands” worked very successfully during the Iraq war 
2003. A “network-centric” system of systems consists of an observation (ISR) system, a 
communication system, a system of data processing and analysis, a strike system to deliver 
munitions with pinpoint accuracy and an evaluation system to ascertain the effectiveness of 
such attacks. 
 
 
Agile, lower-cost weapon platforms and delivery systems 
Cruise Missiles (CM) and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) are a new class of “air systems 
fitted with aerodynamic surfaces that provide lift to keep them airborne during the entire 
mission.”31  
 
Cruise Missiles 
Cruise missiles (CMs) have air-breathing engines and can fly variable flight profiles at both 
low and high altitudes. They can be pre-programmed and perform precision-strike missions 
with high accuracy (circular error probable = 2-50m).With a modular payload between 200 
and 500 kg, they can have a range of 150-3,000 km depending on launch platform (aircraft, 
ship, submarine or ground-based). CMs are inexpensive systems compared to ballistic 
missiles or aircraft with a low infrared and radar signature. Various in-flight guidance systems 
and their combination with inertial or satellite-based navigation, terrain-contour guidance and 
terminal homing systems give them pinpoint accuracy. If a state has aero-industrial 
capabilities, it can manufacture CMs. Lawrence Freedman called CM “the paradigmatic 
weapon of RMA”32 and indeed the US used the Tomahawk CM, which was first deployed in 
1984, extensively in Desert Storm (CMs fired: 332), Desert Fox (415) and Iraqi Freedom 
(955).  
 
Countries with aircraft industries can afford to develop and build CMs for their own use or for 
export. There are three paths to acquiring a CM: (1) indigenous development, (2) the 
conversion of an anti-ship missile and (3) purchase from the growing ranks of manufacturers. 
It is believed that today 80,000 CMs, representing 75 different systems, are deployed in 81 
countries, but 90 percent are older short-range systems (max. 100km) or anti-ship CMs 
(ASCMs). A study concluded that nearly 70 nations possess sea- and land-launched ASCMs 
and 20 possess air-launched CMs (ALCMs).33 The ranks of manufacturers are expanding: 19 
countries currently produce ASCMs and, of these, eleven export them.34 Russia, certainly an 
important manufacturer of CMs, is jointly developing a 290 km ASCM with India. Only the 
                                               
31 See D. Gormley: New developments in unmanned air vehicles and land-attack cruise missiles in: SIPRI 
Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, 2003, chapter 12, pp. 409-432. 
32 L. Freedman: 1998, p.70 (footnote 4). 
33 T. Mahnken: The Cruise Missile Challenge, CSBA, Washington DC, March 2005. 
34 Ibid., p.13 
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US, Russia and probably China35 have strategic CMs with ranges greater than 1,000 
kilometers; Israel and India might follow. Around 42 new systems are in development in 
different countries. Air defense against such low-visible systems “over the horizon”, which 
have a small “radar cross section” and a small “thermal signature”, is possible but not easy 
and very cost-intensive.36 Their technical capabilities, low thermal and radar signature, and 
low cost make them an attractive weapons system. There is also a growing concern that the 
proliferation of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) can pose a threat to the US37 and other 
countries.  
 
Unmanned air vehicles 
Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) are reusable loitering systems primarily used today for ISR 
missions, but also for target acquisition, damage assessment and communication relay. The 
operators of such UAVs can sit 1,000 km away without risking their lives. These UAVs are 
paradigmatic for NCW. They are generally unarmed systems, but some have been modified to 
carry weapons. They can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely at high or low altitude and 
are equipped to return home. They can be very large and heavy or very small in size, can use a 
range of propulsion systems and can transport different payloads (from a few kg to 250 kg). 
The various systems range in cost from a few thousand to tens of millions of US dollars. 
Important characteristics are endurance time, weight, range, ceiling, etc. Different payloads 
can be used for a wide spectrum of missions beside traditional tasks such as meteorology, 
searching for WMD or combat search and rescue. UAVs and Cruise Missiles can also be used 
for the delivery of bioweapons. D. Gormley follows that “the spread of these systems globally 
will affect US military dominance, regional stability and homeland defence.”38 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Increasing annual funding for UAVs39,40 
 
The medium altitude long endurance (24 hours) MQ-1 Predator has flown since 1995 
surveillance missions over Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The high altitude long-
endurance RQ-4 Global Hawk is a very large aircraft with a payload of 1-2 tons of electronic 
and remote-monitoring equipment, including infrared, electro-optical and radar sensors. It 
operates at an altitude of 20 km with a constant speed of 500 km/h. Such UAVs can help to 
                                               
35 See: Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) Hong Niao / Chang Feng, GlobalSecurity.org 
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/lacm.htm] 
36 See: M. O’Hanlon: Cruise Control, in: The National Interest, Spring 2002, pp. 89-93. 
37 US Department of Defense: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, Washington, D.C. 
38 See Gormley 2003, p. 432 (foonote 31). 
39 US Department of Defense: UnmannedAircraft System Roadmap 2005-2030, Washington, D.C 
40 US Department of Defense: Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032, Washington, D.C 
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track friendly forces and warn them of “what is behind the next corner”. During the 2003 Iraq 
war, Global Hawk UAVs found 55 per cent of time-sensitive air-defense targets, while 
making up only three per cent of total ISR missions.41 Hyperspectral sensor packages are 
under development that can analyze hundreds of frequency bands and might be capable of 
analyzing detailed information from the ground. 
 
Miniaturized UAVs such as the “Over-the-Hill” Dragon Eye (1.8kg) and Pointer (3.6kg) can 
be hand-launched and operated by a single soldier at company or platoon level and have 
already been used in the 2003 Iraq war. DARPA and the US Army are exploring so-called 
Micro Air Vehicles (MAV), which have a wingspan of 10 cm and weigh less than 0.5 kg.  
 
Future development goals are to transform UAVs into joint unmanned combat aircraft 
systems for a wider spectrum of combat missions (SEAD, strike, electronic attack etc.) with 
an improved data link and stealth capabilities (e.g. the planned Joint Unmanned Combat Air 
System J-UCAS). Other goals are to reduce weight, increase agility and integrate robotics. 
New unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV) for submarine warfare are also under development. 
Between 1990 and 1999, the Pentagon’s expenditures for R&D, procurement and operation of 
UAVs were three billion US dollars. Annual funding for UAVs ballooned after September 
2001, reaching 2.23 billion dollars in fiscal year 2007.42 The US inventory is expected to 
grow from 250 UAVs today to 675 by 2010.43 
 
Currently the Pentagon believes that some 32 nations are developing or manufacturing more 
than 250 different types of UAV and that 41 countries have some 80 models in operation.44 
UAVs and UAV technology are even more widely available. There is a potential for terrorist 
groups to use UAVs to deliver chemical or biological weapons, though the possibility already 
exists that small private aircraft or even models could be hijacked to the same ends. 
 
 
Precision guided munitions with different ranges (PGM)  
The accuracy of both long- and short-range delivery systems has increased dramatically in the 
last 50 years due to advances in navigation and guidance technologies. In their most recent 
campaigns, the US military has demonstrated an increasing arsenal of wire-, laser-, and radio-
guided missiles, either line-of-sight fired, capable of finding their target automatically with 
pinpoint accuracy, or steered manually by a person observing the target via TV camera. 
Laser-guided bombs are guided to the target by “target illuminators”, which use laser beams 
aimed at the target. A laser-guided bomb follows the target signature. It is believed that there 
are more than 80 missile types in the US inventory that use laser-guidance, GPS, anti-
radiation, heat-seeking or terrain-mapping technologies.45 The Joint Direct Attack Munition 
(JDAM) package makes it possible to transform a “dumb bomb” into a “smart weapon” 
accurate to five meters by adding a “GPS/INS navigation kit”. One package costs about 
15,000 euros and the bomb can be delivered from an altitude of 13 km with a range of 25 
km.46 Military logic sees more accurate ammunition as a means to reduce explosive yield, 
lower stocks of ammunition and reduce the number of attempts needed to hit a target. Long-
range Tomahawk CM can be launched from ships or aircraft and, after a flight of 1,100 km, 
                                               
41 D. Fulghum: War from 60,000 Ft., Aviation Week & Space Technology, No. 159/10, 8.9. 2003, pp. 54-57.  
42 US Department of Defense: Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032, Washington, D.C. 
43 Ibid, p. 37. 
44 US Department of Defense: UnmannedAircraft System Roadmap 2005-2030, Washington, D.C 
45 See G. Chapman 2003, p. 133 (footnote 5). 
46 For details see: R. Garwin: Precision Munition and the systems in which they are embedded- GPS, mapping, 
high-resolution radar, and non-lethal weapons, in: P. Fogelberg (ed.), Changing Threats to Global Security: 
Peace or Turmoil, Helsinki 2003, p. 111-118. 
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have an accuracy of 3-5 meters due to the combination of INS, terrain matching and an 
inertial navigation system, as discussed above. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of precision guided munitions 
Type Name Accuracy 
(estimated) 
Delivery 
Anti-Tank Dragon 1-2m Hand held 
Cruise Missiles Tomahawk 3-5 m Land attack, 880km/h 
Missile ATACMS 5-10 m MLRS, Ground-launched 
Air delivered 
Bomb 
JDAMS 5 m B-52 
UCAV Predator/Hellfire;  
J-UCAS 
1-3 m Ground launched 
 
In Afghanistan and Yemen, the US demonstrated a Predator UAV armed with Hellfire 
missiles to attack alleged al-Qaeda targets. Tragically, innocent people were hit and killed - 
non-combatants, in several cases.  
 
 
New weapons effects  
The output power of modern day lasers ranges from milliwatts to megawatts for continuous 
output power, or even petawatts (1015 W) for short-pulse lasers. In military terms, lasers with 
continuous output powers greater than 20 kW are classified as High Energy Lasers (HEL). 
Output powers in the kilowatt range or above allow the creation of laser beams with potential 
harmful intensity over distances of up to several hundred kilometers. These beams can be 
used to heat up targets, which may lead to structural failure of the target object. The first 
military applications of lasers were developed in the mid to late 1960s, and massive amounts 
of money have been spent on further R&D since then.47 At present, a number of research 
programs is focusing specifically on laser-based directed energy weapons (DEWs). In 2005, 
the US government alone spent more than half a billion US dollars on DEW R&D. Other 
industrial countries, such as France and Germany, are also researching HELs. Others, such as 
Russia, have done so in the past and might still have significant expertise in this field. Lasers 
may also be used as active sensors. This means that information is gathered using a laser 
beam which is emitted and then partly reflected back onto the sensor (laser radar). If the 
intensity of this beam is sufficient to damage a target, a sensor laser may also be used as a 
DEW.  
 
Several R&D projects for developing HEL are in the pipeline, especially in the US. One such 
is the Airborne Laser (ABL), which is aiming at ballistic missile defense. The idea is to use a 
Boeing 747 airplane as a flying platform for a multi-megawatt HEL (a chemical oxygen-
iodine laser [COIL] with a wavelength of 1.315 µm) to circle around hostile missile bases and 
destroy launched missiles in their boost phase.48 The estimated range of an ABL is between 
200 and 600 km.49 At the moment, some 500 million US dollars are spent per year on the 
construction of a first prototype. The Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) is intended for 
                                               
47 For an introduction, See: J. Stupl/G. Neuneck: High Energy Lasers: A Sensible Choice for Future Weapon 
Systems? in Security Challenges 1/2005, p. 135-153 
48 G. Forden: Ballistic Missile Defense: The Airborne Laser, IEEE Spectrum, vol. 34(9), September 1997, pp. 
40-9. 
49 D K Barton et al., Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for 
National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues, Review of Modern Physics, vol. 76, no. 3, 2004, p. 
301 [http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/nmd03.cfm]. 
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point defense. Its primary task would be defending a limited area against mortars shells and 
artillery rockets. 
 
Military HELs are relatively new and constitute a new type of weapon. As with any new 
technology, the first important question is whether and how HELs will proliferate in the 
future. Since there is a great number of laser applications in material processing, one 
immediate possibility is that proliferation of HEL weapons might be fueled by the existence 
of industrial lasers. However, the equipment used in laser material processing is relatively 
expensive and has to be modified significantly before it can be used in a military setting. In 
addition, the output power of industrial lasers is usually lower than ten kW. The availability 
of these lasers could nonetheless facilitate research for governments keen on obtaining 
military HELs. Another key question that needs to be addressed is whether and to what extent 
the future use of HELs may potentially lead to political instability or the escalation of an 
existing conflict. One example of a potentially destabilizing event is the deployment of a 
ground- or space-based laser anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Following a successful attack 
utilizing an ASAT weapon, the country attacked and other countries may be uncertain as to 
whether a future satellite loss is the result of a technical failure or an attack by a hostile 
power. In time of crisis, alone the existence of such a weapon might be enough to trigger 
military escalation. It is interesting to note in this context that the US first tested HELs for use 
against satellites in October 1997 to examine whether a ground-based HEL could blind their 
sensors. 
 
Another area of research are non-lethal weapons (NLWs), which would be better dubbed 
“less-lethal weapons”. They include a long list of new weapon technologies which have been 
developed or are already deployed, such as strong nets for stopping cars and trucks and 
electroshock guns that use high voltage darts to “disable people” by temporarily disrupting 
nerve and muscle function. Another area are chemicals for incapacitating people. 
 
The RMA debate has also involved discussion of other future modes of warfare. In 
Cyberwarfare the information infrastructure (the Internet, communication networks, 
distribution nodes, etc.) will become an object of warfare. John Arquila and David Ronfeldt 
argue that the realm of warfare is Cyberspace itself, which is “an enemy’s electronic sensory, 
organs, nervous system, or brain.”50 Two modes of doing harm to critical infrastructure are 
possible. One is to bomb the physical infrastructure using brute force; the other is for 
government-employed hackers to infiltrate electronic viruses, trojans or other mal-ware into 
electronic systems. Anyone familiar with computers knows that the vulnerabilities of 
commercially available computer systems are a constant fact. Another important aspect of 
information warfare is the manipulation and distortion of media information in order to ensure 
that the images presented to the world are favorable to one’s side. Embedded journalists, the 
use of bomb-mounted cameras to give a misleading impression of “surgical” operations and a 
one-sided media policy also play an increasing role in warfighting.51 
 
 
Space-based warfare 
Space assets such as communication, positioning (e.g. GPS), and surveillance satellites are 
becoming a prerequisite for the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and the conduct of modern 
warfare with forces acting on a global or regional scale. In the coming years, more countries 
                                               
50 J. Arquila, D. Ronfeldt: Information, Power, and Grand Strategy: in: Athená Camp – Section I, Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, p.157. 
51 J. Rantalpelkonen in: E. Halpin et al. Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs. Basingstoke 
2006, p. 51-81. 
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will try to obtain these capabilities by developing space technologies in pursuit of their 
national interests. Outer space is also an important medium for warfare on Earth, but as of 
now, no “weaponized” satellites (e.g. collision devices, shooters or lasers) exist in orbit. 
Preserving this situation and avoiding a costly arms race in space is an important task. There 
are voices in the Pentagon and the US Air Force vigorously pursuing “the option to deploy 
weapons in space to deter threats and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests”.52 
US Air Force Doctrine 2-2.1 states that “[s]pace superiority provides freedom to attack as 
well as freedom from attack”. On May 24, 2005 the New York Times reported that “[t]he Air 
Force is pressing hard to develop defensive and offensive space weapons without adequately 
considering the potential adverse consequences”.  
 
In the Pentagon’s Annual Defense Report 2001, we find the following: “Space is now part of 
the tactical battlefield and its use is growing”.53 As of December 31, 2001, about 200 military 
satellites were circulating in different orbits around the Earth.54 The wars in Afghanistan 2001 
and in Iraq 2003 clearly showed that space support is a key factor in modern warfare, as is 
well documented. The 1991 Gulf War was the first war intensively supported by space-based 
systems. According to the Kosovo After-Action Report 2000: “Space Assets also provided 
important capabilities. Improved weather forecasting capabilities, enabled by space-based 
sensors, made the application of aerospace power more effective throughout Operation Allied 
Force”.55 The use of space platforms is indispensable for the build-up of global “Command, 
Control, Computer and Communication” (C4I) Systems. Today, US forces are highly 
dependent on space systems, and the US is the military power that makes the most use of 
space components for military purposes such as surveillance/intelligence/reconnaissance, 
navigation, communication, meteorology, early warning, mapping, weapon control, etc. Using 
its various space components, the US military can collect information and coordinate, 
communicate, navigate and support a wide range of military operations that permit precise 
conventional attacks on targets.56 
 
 
Net-Centric warfare 
Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) is a new organizational principle that binds together 
surveillance, command, control and weapons use in a network, cross linked by 
communication and data interfaces.57 The main desired military advantages of NCW are high 
information availability through use of high-speed data transmission, sensors, GPS and data 
fusion to provide field units and command with a full spectrum of battlefield knowledge, 
thereby helping to enable faster decision-making and immediate execution. At the same time, 
long-distance weapons and superior reconnaissance should minimize the risk of suffering 
casualties, while, in theory, precision weapons should help to save ammunition. 
 
Other countries have developed similar concepts: Net-Centric Warfare Capabilities (Sweden), 
Network Centric Operations (Germany), Air Land Operational Bubble (France). There can be 
no question but that these concepts are still in their infancy. The 2003 Iraq War involved 
                                               
52 Report of the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington 
D.C., Januar 2001:xii. 
53 W. Cohen: Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, D.C., 2001. 
54 J. Pike: The Military Use of Outer Space, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security, Oxford 2002, p. 613- 664. 
55 Department of Defense, Kosovo After Action Report, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force 
After Action Report, Washington D.C. 2000, p.58. 
56 Pike 2002, pp. 613-664 (footnote 54). 
57 Other terms are C4ISR which is Command, Control, Communication, Computer Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance. 
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some elements of NCW, but there has been no serious assessment of the use of NCW in real 
combat situations. Skeptics point to many problems emerging from elements of NCW, 
including a lack of standards and constant information overflow, and the vulnerability of 
modern technologies to countermeasures. 
 
Cross linking RMA elements to enable NCW-type warfare has both military and political 
consequences. In military terms, transforming force structures by integrating new 
technologies implies the need for constant field experiments, improved training and 
simulation and the permanent adaptation of doctrines and tactics. Furthermore, the lines 
between military, intelligence and stabilization forces become blurred. Politically, there is a 
risk that the promise of minimizing casualties may lower the threshold at which war is 
considered acceptable. The emphasis of powerful states on high-tech systems also increases 
the likelihood of their antagonists’ making use of asymmetric responses and countermeasures, 
such as “unconventional” methods of warfare, thus fuelling the proliferation of new weapon 
systems and WMDs. 
 
 
Proving grounds: Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
The war in Iraq 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and the military intervention in Afghanistan 
can be called the first proving grounds of US Net-Centric Warfare strategy. The campaign in 
Afghanistan began with a deployment of special forces and precision air strikes. In Iraq, by 
contrast, a compact 41-day ground and air offensive was followed by occupation. 
  
The 2003 invasion of Iraq gave a foretaste of what is now called “net-centric warfare”: remote 
sensing, communications, networked sensor platforms gave the US-led coalition an 
overwhelming military advantage. There were just 20 days between the first attack on March 
20, 2003, and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad. At the same time, 
however, one should not forget that the environment and the circumstances were very much 
in favor of US/UK forces. They had enough time to prepare, the adversary was poorly 
motivated and the Iraqis’ equipment was in bad shape. A balanced analysis of the effects of 
the military technology is still open. There are reports that indicate that modern technology 
very often failed. There is no doubt that coalition casualties were very low during the first 20 
days (160 soldiers) but the exact number of Iraqi casualties is unknown. During the 1991 Gulf 
War, around 75,000 are estimated to have died. An Internet database that lists deaths reported 
in the media counted up to 7,350 deaths as a result of coalition military action during the 
“major-combat” phase prior to May 1, 2003. In 828 days of US-led occupation, 1916 Iraq 
coalition casualties were counted.58 So far, images of surgical strikes are dominating the 
public perception of the campaign. The long-term effects of the “precision warfare” on the 
civilian population and infrastructure are generally neglected. Due to the breakdown of the 
healthcare system and the public infrastructure (water, electricity, sanitation, etc.) in Iraq, a 
MEDACT Report from 2004 estimates that 100,000 deaths and many more injuries can be 
attributed to the conflict and violence in Iraq.59 
 
One indicator of the ongoing development of high tech means of waging war is the changing 
ratio in the use of “smart” and “dumb” weapons. Figure 5 shows the changing proportion of 
“smart bombs” used in operations since Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This is paralleled by 
the rise in the number of cruise missiles during the last war in Iraq, as shown in Figure 6. 
                                               
58 Iraqi Body Count Database http://icasualties.org/oif/ [accessed on June 23, 2005]. The numbers are based on 
reports carried in the international media.  
59 Medact: Enduring effects of war: health in Iraq 2004, London (www.medact.org) 
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Figure 5: The balance between “dumb” and “smart” bombs is shifting 
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Figure 6: The increasing use of Cruise Missiles in US military campaigns 
 
   
Collateral Damage – The Myth of Precision Weapons 
 
High tech does not necessarily mean less damage or fewer casualties.60 Such weapons can 
cause significant damage on the ground depending on the specific target and the submunition 
used. For instance, a warhead such as the CBU-87 Combined Effects Munitions, which 
consists of 202 bomblets, has a destructive radius of more than 150 m. Precision weapons 
may reach point targets with high accuracy, but even then they can cause huge damage 
depending on the target. Furthermore there is a common belief that precision ammunition is 
only deployed against military targets, but who defines a military target? High-tech wars are 
also often labeled “clean wars” in spite of the increasing deployment of weapons banned (at 
last in spirit) by International Humanitarian Law. These include fuel-air explosives and 
cluster munitions – wide-area ammunition delivered with high accuracy. The environmental 
and humanitarian consequences of other weapon types such as white phosphorus, depleted 
uranium or thermobaric weapons are not clear in the framework of International Law. The 
distinction between WMDs and conventional weaponry is blurring further. The destruction 
area of bombs such as the BLU-82 “daisy cutter” or “fuel-air explosives” is comparable to the 
direct destruction effects of small tactical nuclear weapons. Here it is likely to be all but 
impossible to discriminate between military forces and non-combatants. 
                                               
60 Two laser-guided GBU-27 smart bombs (2,000 lbs) hit the Amariya Bunker in Baghdad on February 13, 1991 
killing approximately 408 civilians. The military believed it was an important command post. “Smarter” 
bombs still hit civilians, Christian Science Monitor, October 2002, 
[http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1022/p01s01-wosc.htm]. 
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Improvements in accuracy are lowering costs and risks for air forces, but not necessarily for 
ground forces and the population. Today, it is possible to destroy any specific target with far 
fewer bombs (approx. 5%) than 25 years ago. But precision is a highly relative attribute. In 
the Iraq war, heavy munitions, equivalent in power to some 12,000 metric tons of TNT, were 
used as a key element of the US military strategy during the first month.61 Many guided 
bombs with an accuracy of 13 meters weighed between 225 and 900 kg. Truly safe distances 
for unprotected people in the open area are between 500 and 1000 meters. There is also no 
direct correlation between precision warfare and casualties. On the contrary, more precision 
can mean more deaths, depending on what kind of targets are hit in which environment. In the 
first month of the US-led invasion in Iraq, it was estimated that between 7,350 and 11.000 
Iraqis were killed. Thirty percent of the deaths were non-combatants. This fact does not 
support the “clean war” thesis. Much more important are weapon effects, the quality of target 
information and technical reliability. Other estimates of the Iraqi death rate, based on non-
representative data, are much higher. In October 2006, medical journal The Lancelet 
estimated 655,000 excess deaths in the Iraqi population.62 
 
During the first 40 days of the high-intensity high-speed 2003 invasion of Iraq “only” 169 US 
and British soldiers were killed (see Figure 8). In the first year (ending 19/3/2004), 585 US 
soldiers were killed; in the second year, 936; and the third, 787. The casualties were 
significantly higher during the battles in Fallujah (see Figure 8). As of April 7, 2008, 4200 
British and US Soldiers have been killed. The number of attacks with makeshift bombs 
against allied forces doubled from 5,607 to 10,593 in 2004. Around half of the Americans 
killed in 2005 were killed by “improvised explosive devices”. These are inexpensive to make 
and easy to fashion from Iraq’s vast stockpiles of munitions. The explosives and shape 
charges are detonated by triggers such as garage-door openers, infrared beams and timers.63 
Despite spending more to protect their forces, the high-tech army was not able to fix the 
problem. It is certainly one thing to conquer a country, but another challenge for the military 
to hold, stabilize and secure such a country. In December 2006, Baghdad was isolated 
electrically, as insurgents cut off critical high-voltage lines from power plants outside the 
capital.64 Nearly 6,400 Iraqi civilians were killed in November and December 2006, thus 
putting the total civilian casualty figure for the year 2006 at 34,452 dead and 36,685 injured.65 
 
Of the 9,270 civilians deaths caused by US-led troops between 2003 and 2005, 6,882 
occurred during the period of main hostilities that lasted until the end of April (“mission 
accomplished”), and 6,616 of these took place in the first 20 days, the period of the main air 
strikes (figure 7). These numbers do not support the thesis that collateral damage was very 
low.  
 
                                               
61 See C. Conetta: 2006 (see Footnote 18) 
62 http://www.iraqbodycount.org/press/pr14.php [January 16, 2007] 
63 E. Schmitt: Pentagon Widens Program to Foil Bombings in Iraq, New York Times, February 6, 2007. 
64 J. Glanz: Iraq Insurgents Starve Capital of Electricity, New York Times December 2006 
65 Over 34,000 civilians killed in Iraq in 2006, says UN report on rights violations, UN News Center, January 16, 
2006 [http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21241&Cr=iraq&Cr1=]. 
The Revolution in Military Affairs, its Driving Forces, Elements and Complexity 
21 
 
Figure 7: Civilians killed by US-led forces in Iraq per month66 
 
Conversely, there were few US casualties during the military offensive attack on Baghdad – 
139 US soldiers were killed and 543 were wounded – but by the end of April 2003, the 
number of US casualties had increased heavily in some months. From May 2003 to the end of 
February 2008, 3,835 US soldiers were killed and over 28,766 were wounded. Ultimately, this 
shows that the strategy of net-centric warfare may be effective during main combat 
operations, but seems to fail during the occupation of a country. Figure 8 also demonstrates 
that the number of deaths is increasing drastically in urban fighting. 
  
 
 
   
Main hostilities 
20.03.2003 - 30.04.2003 
Occupation 
01.05.2003 - 29.02.2008 Total 
accidental 31 696 727 
hostile 108 3139 3247 
killed US Soldiers 139 3835 3974 
wounded US Soldiers 548 28766 29314 
      Source: http://icasualties.org/oif/ 
Figure 8: US casualties in Iraq between March 2003 and February 2008 
 
                                               
66 Iraq Body Count press release on A Dossier Of Civilian Casualties 2003-2005, 
[http://www.iraqbodycount.org/press/pr12.php]. 
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The experiences in Iraq demonstrate that NCW technology might be useful in conquering a 
country and fighting defenders at high speed. But that other strategies and approaches are 
necessary when it comes to securing and stabilizing a country.  
 
 
Complexity and War 
 
War is a complex, nonlinear process of violent interactions where technological superiority is 
not a guarantee of success. Clausewitz explains this in his own words: “As long as we have no 
personal knowledge of war, we cannot conceive where those difficulties lie of which so much 
is said, and what that genius, and those extraordinary mental powers required in a general, 
have really to do. All appears so simple, all the requisite branches of knowledge appear so 
plain, all the combinations so unimportant, that, in comparison with them, the easiest problem 
in higher mathematics impresses us with a certain scientific dignity. But if we have seen war, 
all becomes intelligible; and still, after all, it is extremely difficult to describe what it is which 
brings about this change, to specify this invisible and completely efficient factor. Everything 
is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and 
produce a friction, which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war.”67 Alan 
Beyerchen understood Clausewitz correctly when he wrote: “Clausewitz ought to display a 
deep and abiding concern for unpredictability and complexity, and consequently to search for 
ways to express the importance of such matters as context, interaction, effects 
disproportionate to their causes, sensitivity to initial conditions, time-dependent evolutionary 
processes, and the serious limitations of linear analysis."68 
 
 
4. Preventive Arms Control 
 
Current developments in the way wars are fought certainly have consequences for the stability 
and potential extension of existing arms-control regimes. The entire sophisticated 
conventional-arms-control edifice, which was basically built on quantitative criteria such as 
agreed ceilings of major weapon systems, may start to crumble in the not-so-distant future if 
the new elements of modern warfare are not taken into account. The basic concept of the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was to achieve “a secure and stable balance” and to 
eliminate “the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive 
action in Europe”. The CFE Treaty is based on quantitative limits on five major weapon 
systems for different regional zones. In the future, it will become more and more obvious that 
the density and effectiveness of military forces cannot be measured simply “in numbers of 
tanks and fighter aircraft”, but that other categories such as cruise missiles, UAVs and 
perhaps other robotic systems or autonomous vehicles will have to be included.  
 
During the Cold War, it became clear that the effectiveness of arms-control regimes can be 
bypassed by technological innovation and proliferation. As defined by Thomas Schelling, the 
objectives of arms control are69: 
 
a) Reducing the likelihood of war,  
b) Lowering the cost of preparing for war, and  
c) Minimizing the death and destruction that occur if control fails and it comes to war. 
                                               
67 Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831): On War (1832), Book 1, Chapter 7, [J.J. Graham translation London in 
1873]. 
68 A. Beyerchen Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and Unpredictability, International Security 1992 
69 T.C. Schelling, M. H. Halperin (1961). Strategy and Arms Control. New York,, Twentieth Century Fund. 
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Another important criterion for future weapon use ought to be Humanitarian Law, which is 
designed to limit the reach and the intensity of armed conflict, not to protect the interests of 
the “haves”. To guarantee the effectiveness of arms control, it has to be transformed in two 
ways. First, arms control in the 21st century has to cope with the technological dynamics by 
addressing qualitative aspects of armament. This is especially true with regard to asymmetric 
capabilities. It should be in the interest of many actors to reduce, limit or prohibit specific 
uses of dangerous weapons such as space weapons. Second, arms control has to reflect the 
profound changes of the post-Cold-War, globalized world. It must therefore become more 
flexible and more comprehensive and include a wider range of criteria and options. As the 
very concept of preventive arms control suggests, not only quantitative aspects of military 
forces, but also future technical developments should be taken into account. This widens the 
scope of arms control into the area of military related R&D. The evaluation of military R&D 
programs can be performed as part of a systematic arms-technology assessment. Preventive 
arms control aims to avoid costly and dangerous technology-driven arms races by preventing 
the deployment of new weapon technologies on the battlefield. A prospective scientific 
assessment and military-operational analysis of the technology in question are necessary 
under specific criteria such as: 
 
(1) Adherence to and further development of effective arms control, disarmament and 
international law,  
(2) Maintaining and improving stability, and  
(3) Protecting humans, the environment and societies. 
 
Based on such an assessment, a ban or limitations of military usable technology or weapons 
systems before acquisition or deployment should be considered. It should be considered 
whether to carry out preventive arms assessment on the following types of weapons: 
 
- Cruise missiles and UAVs, 
- Space weapons, nanotechnology, non-lethal weapons. Directed energy systems such as 
high-energy lasers, microwave weapons. 
 
In addition, various agreements lack effective verification procedures, and it would be 
desirable to invest more in verification and monitoring technologies. The Open Skies Treaty 
should be revitalized, and additional options such as early warning missions should be 
integrated. Other areas, such as the protection of forces and civilian populations or the 
improvement of “identification friend-foe” systems to avoid friendly fire, are also subjects of 
ongoing research. The key task for the “globalized world” is first and foremost to develop 
strategies to win the “hearts and minds” of the people in zones of violent conflict. The 
inclusion of civil society is fundamental and armed forces should seek to enter into dialogue 
with civil society before it comes to an uncontrollable escalation of violence.
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